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z Initial organization set up in ’72-73
– MA Khan « strategic commander »
z SA Butt « tactical commander »
z Directorate of Technical Procurement (PAEC)
z Two kinds
– Major State-to-State contracts
z Western countries (until around 1980)
z China, North Korea
– Direct imports from Western firms
z Many of them authorized
z Most of them unauthorized
Imports: Strategy (1)
z Systematic use of Pakistani embassies
z Involvement of Pakistani-born foreign nationals
z Extensive use of personal connections (AQK)
z Redundancy (multiple buyers)
z Sample buying (for later reproduction)
z Needle in haystack
z Plus classic tricks:
– front companies
– multiple intermediaries
– false end-user certificates
Imports: Strategy (2)
z Strategy evolves over time
– Evolution to adapt to exports restrictions
z Individual components (rather than entire units), 
pre-forms (rather than ready-made units)
– AQK gains more autonomy
– China becomes key supplier
z Financial dimension
– West Asian firms, BCCI
Imports: Who Did What?
zMost known actual imports : from 
European firms
– Germany
– Switzerland, Belgium, Netherlands, France  
z But very high number of known attempted
imports from US firms
Imports: 
Not Unlike Iraq 1980s…
z Common points
– Redundancy (Iraq: two different networks)
– Use of Iraqi embassies
z Finances
z Imports of small or sub- components (via diplomatic pouch)
z Several individuals involved in both cases
z Several European companies involved in both 
cases
z …but Pakistani network more centralized
Imports: Why So Much 
Success in 1970s and 1980s?
z Denial, Delusion, Defiance
– Don’t want to know what they’ll do with the 
equipment
– If we don’t sell them, others will
– Don’t believe Pakistan will succeed in making 
the Bomb
– If others have the Bomb, why not Pakistan?
Imports: Why Europe?
z Less committed to non-proliferation until 1991
– Weaker exports controls
– Defiance vis-à-vis the US
z URENCO described as « an act of resistance »
z Independence (France, Switzerland)
z Increasingly liberal intra-European trade policies
– Allowing Pakistan to hide final destination




– Machine-tools, engineering and precision mechanics, 
nuclear enrichment (URENCO)
z Not a nuclear power: exports controls less 
developed, less efficient
– Lack of expertise in some areas
z AQK’s own experience
– Identification of German firms
– Personal contacts and friendships
Imports: What About the US?
z GAO, 1994:
– 1988-1992, more than 80% of applications for 
exports of nuclear-related equipment to 
Pakistan were approved (650 out of 808)
z Including 3 to sensitive end-users (out of 9)




Imports: To Be Continued
z 2005-2006: 
– Swiss intercept shipment of Russian-made 
aluminium
– EU intelligence: Pakistan still shopping for 
high-grade aluminium, ring magnets, machine-
tools…
– Russian July 2006 White Paper




– Privatization of one part of the Pakistani
imports network, starting mid-1980s
– Small numbers (~50), a real family business 
(cf. the Tinner family, the Griffin family)
– Company run from Pakistan (Farooq, Tahir) 
and Dubai
– Several nodes (Malaysia, South Africa…), 
firewalls; warehouses (Sudan)
Exports: Different Cases, 
Different Responsibilities
z Iran
– Three different phases
z 1987-1988, 1988-1991, 1991-1995
– Clear involvement of CoAS MA Beg, probably GI 
Khan
z North Korea
– Were nuclear exports explicitly approved?
– Role of CoAS AW Kakar, J. Karamat?  
z Iraq, Libya, Syria
– AQK own initiative, perhaps with some tacit approval 
by military authorities
– Went beyond his mandate and got carried away
Exports: Different Cases, 
Different Responsbilities
zMost exports took place between 1988 
(death of Zia) and 1999 (Musharraf coup)
– Power structure in Pakistan was complex, 
diffuse responsibilities
z Civilian responsibilities
– Bhutto and Sharif were at least partly aware of 
some transfers
– President GI Khan
Imports and Exports: Same
Network?
z Experience and contacts gained in imports very 
useful for exports
z Clear specific links
– Some imports both for national and foreign needs
z Large quantities, unexplained
– Key individuals involved in both
z Pakistan: Farooq
z Europe: Griffin, Lerch, Slebos, Tinner, Mebus
– Dubai as major platform for both
– BCCI used both ways (until 1991)
Imports and Exports: Same 
Network?
z…but not merely « reversal of the flow »
– Large number of Pakistani acquisitions were 
PAEC-controlled
– AQK Inc. was « privatized subsidiary » of 
Pakistani imports network
– Libya (biggest case of export) was an ad hoc 
operation
Some conclusions (1)
z AQK Inc.: more an « imports/exports business »
than a « Wal-Mart »
z The case is not closed
– Parts of the exports network probably still exist
– Pakistani imports continue
z AQK unique case because based on experience
and contacts gained for national nuclear program
– Future cases: Iran? North Korea?
Some conclusions (2)
z On top of Iraq, Pakistan case has been
wake-up call for European exports controls
– But issues remain
z Structural problem of controlling exports of dual-use 
components, subparts in globalized market
z Disparities in dual-use goods exports controls in the
EU
– …do not help when several countries involved 
z Often controlled by government institutions with 
limited technical expertise, plus conflict of interest
